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Abstract
The paper explores the analogy between city and two-sided market. It
generalizes the results on the pricing strategies of the platform in the two-
sided markets for the case when concentration spillover plays an important
role. The two-sided market framework is applied to model a city. The
paper highlights the importance of the network effect and labor market
structure for city size, governance and agglomeration formation. The cases
of an isolated city and competing cities are considered.
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1 Introduction
The paper explores analogy between city and two-sided market and develops a
model of city management.
The contribution of the paper is two-fold. On the one hand, it generalizes
some of the results on the pricing strategies of the platform in two-sided market,
obtained by Rochet and Tirole [2004] and Armstrong [2006]. The model of
two-sided market, developed in this paper, is applied to the analysis of city
management.
On the other hand, the paper contributes to the urban economics literature
as it highlights the importance of the multi-sided nature of the city, whereas
urban economics typically concentrates on the production side of a city.
I consider the monopolistic platform and the competing platforms cases, or,
in words of urban economics, an isolated city and a city, competing for the firms
and the citizens with another city1. The earnings of the firms and the citizens
form a tax base, which is an important objective for the city manager.
∗I’m grateful to Jean-Charles Rochet for advising on this research. I’m also grateful to
the participants of the Brown Bag Seminar in Toulouse School of Economics for their useful
comments.
1The world ”city” is used here in a broad context. It can be understood as a region or
even as a country.
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A particular attention is paid to the concentration spillover and labor match-
ing market structure. From the two-sided market prospective, they determine
the structure of the benefits of the platform users and the particular form of
interaction on the platform. I show that they have an important influence on
the size of the cities, urban agglomeration and taxation strategy of the city
manager.
The particularities of the interaction between firms and workers-citizens2
motivates the generalization of the benchmark models of two-sided market.
I assume that the city manager is aimed at maximizing the tax revenues
in the city. This objective is closely related to the political power of the city
manager. For instance, the large tax revenues collected in a city or a region
can serve as an important argument in political bargaining with higher level
authorities as it can be used as an evidence of importance of the city (region)
for the national economy. The cite manager can also be interested in increasing
the tax revenues because his earnings from managing the city can be directly
related to the collected taxes.
For the case of a monopoly platform, which corresponds to an isolated city, I
analyze, first, the case of the active city management, i.e. when the city manager
acts as a platform in two-sided market, ”actively” changing the taxes (access fees
for the platform users). Second, I consider the passive city management (free
entry, or self-organization of a city), when a site for forming a city (platform)
serves merely as a focal point for agglomeration of economic activity. The two
cases are compared to the social optimum.
For the case of an isolated city under active city management, I show that
the the taxes are set at the level which leads to the suboptimal city size (in
terms of population and the level of production). I characterize the tax level
which implements the optimal size of the city. I also show that under free entry,
the city size will be distorted compared to the optimum, but the direction of
the distortion depends on the determinants of the benefits of the firms and the
citizens from connecting to the city.
For the case of competing platforms (cities), I characterize the taxation
strategies and analyze the sustainability of the configuration with competing
cities rather than one agglomerated city.
I also show the importance of the labor market structure for the stability
of the competing cities configuration and the taxation strategies of the city
manager.
The model of the paper is based on the main approaches in modeling the
two-sided markets and follows the standard framework in the urban economic
literature.
The survey Fujita and Thisse [1996] pointed out that the main factors of
concentration which lead to city creation: externalities related to knowledge
spillover, increasing returns (they authors link it to the increasing variety) and
spatial competition.
The idea that the spillover effects play an important role for the city forma-
tion and the production in the city is well established in the literature. Often
the spillover is related to knowledge and ideas creation, accumulation and diffu-
sion. Jacobs [1969] argues that knowledge generation plays an important role.
The importance of knowledge accumulation is highlighted in Romer [1986]. The
2This can be generalized to the interaction on others markets for the production inputs
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model based on knowledge and ideas diffusion is developed in Jovanovic and Rob
[1989]. In general, the role of information spillover is discussed in Fujita and
Ogawa [2005], Imai [2005]. The ”creative” side of the cities (as opposed to the
production) is becoming more and more important, as argued in Florida [2003].
Another important component of the city is labor matching market. The
importance of the network effects related to the matching are discussed in Du-
ranton and Puga [2003]. The literature points that not only the chances for
matching but also quality of matching influences firms’ production - see the sur-
veys of Mortensen and Pissarides [1999] and Petrongolo and Pissarides [2001].
Finally, spatial aspects are important. Hotelling [1929] and Lerner and
Singer [1937] have shown that space competition for the market areas leads
to firms concentration3. At the same time, price competition is shown to be
centrifugal force.
Glaeser et al. [2001] argues that the consumption side of the city is im-
portant together with the production side. Despite traditional viewpoint that
cities create advantages for production and disadvantages in consumption, they
demonstrate that attractiveness of the cities for consumers became more impor-
tant especially when firms are highly mobile.
Put generally, the size of the city is determined through interaction between
centrifugal and centripetal forces on both sides of a city - production and con-
sumption.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 I describe the model and present
a motivating example which is used throughout the paper for illustrations of
the general results. In section 3 I consider the case of an isolated city which
corresponds to the monopolistic platform. In section 4 I consider the case of
the two competing cities (platforms). Section 5 concludes.
2 Model setup
2.1 A Model Framework
Every city comprises firms and citizens. To start production, the firms need
some infrastructure provided by the city, such as public facilities, labor (match-
ing) market, institutions etc. The better quality of such kinds of infrastructure
leads to higher production. I will call this infrastructure as production ameni-
ties.
The citizens need the city infrastructure as well to find a job, go for shopping
and finally enjoy consumption. The citizens benefit from better quality of such
kinds of infrastructure. It will be referred to as consumption-oriented amenities.
Firms and citizens can use the same pieces of infrastructure, e.g. labor
market inside the city, water and electricity supply or routes. However, most
of amenities are usage-specific, i.e. they are either production or consumption-
oriented. For example, industrial power supply is used in production only; parks,
entertainment facilities etc. are the consumption amenities. In the model, I
assume that the two sorts of amenities don’t overlap.
I denote by A the city amenities related to production, and by B the city
consumption-oriented amenities.
3the famous result is that the unique Nash equilibrium of the Hotelling two ice-cream
sellers problem is location at the middle of the Hotelling line
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The city is governed by City Manager. In the model the city is considered
as a platform, firms and citizens - as platform users.
Suppose that there is a population of firms and population of (potential)
citizens which may (or may not) be located in the city. Let n1 be the number
of firms located in the city and n2 be the number of citizens.
I adopt the standard assumption of the urban economics that the citizens
commute from their living place inside the city to the working place (the Central
Business District model).
Denote by ϕ1 the profit of a firm located in a city, and by ϕ2 the utility
derived from being in the city for a citizen. They represent the benefits of the
two sides of the platform from joining it. The benefits depend on the number of
firms and citizens n1, n2 as well as on the amenities A,B provided in the city.
The City Manager decides on lump-sum taxes (entry fees) T1 and T2, im-
posed on firms and citizens correspondingly4. The taxes are not restricted to
be positive. In terms of Industrial Organization of the two-sided markets, these
are entry fees. Amenities A and B are considered as exogenously given
The objective of the city Manager is to maximize the overall tax revenues5.
Such objective can reflect the fact that the City Manager cares about his polit-
ical power - the more taxes is collected, the higher is the influence of the City
Manager inside the city and outside it, for instance, in a region or in a country.
For example, the big sum of the tax revenues collected in the city can serve as an
important argument in the political bargaining with the higher level authorities
in the federal state. Alternatively, the City Manager can be interested in maxi-
mizing the tax revenues because his earnings from performing the managing job
depends on the tax revenues in the city.
2.2 A Motivating Example
In this part of the paper I develop a stylized model of a city following the
standard approach of urban economics, see, e.g. Black and Henderson [1999]
and consider its variants.
I will argue that the cornerstone models of the two-sided market literature
of Rochet and Tirole [2004] and Armstrong [2006] are too stylized to capture
the important particularities of the city. Because of this, I will consider a more
general model of two-sided market and generalize the results on the pricing
strategies of the platform, obtained in the above-mentioned papers.
The model will also be used to motivate the assumptions on the functions,
describing the benefits of the platform users (see subsection 2.3). It will also be
used throughout the paper for illustrations of the general results.
Assume that there is a city with n1 firms and n2 citizens (workers). All
production occurs in the center of the city6. The firms don’t have commuting
cost whereas the citizens do.
Let labor be the only input in production and the firm’s production function
is given by
y = ELδ
4The tax levels can be considered as deviations from the ”benchmark” tax (say, determined
by higher level authority). So, taxes can in fact be tax deductions or subsidies to the firms or
other benefits such as preferential terms in land allocation, public infrastructure use etc.
5Different objectives may also be considered
6So, there is CBD - Central Business District.
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where δ < 1 and E is total factor productivity.
There is a local industry-specific externality which increases the total factor
productivity E when there are more workers located in the city7:
E = Anε2 (1)
where A is city production-oriented amenities. However, E is considered as
constant by each firm because firms are small.
The agglomeration effect, modeled here by (1) is an important driving force
for agglomeration of the production activity in the cities. With this modeling,
it is assumed that there are no increasing returns at the firm level. However, in-
creasing returns emerge as a local externality due to concentration of production
activity. The local externality can be attributed to knowledge spillover.
The price for firms’ production is normalized to 1. The firm’s profit is then
pi = ELδ − wL
Each firm’s labor demand is then given by
LD(w) =
(
Eδ
w
) 1
1−δ
and labor demand in the city is n1L
D.
Labor supply in the city is n2.
Consider now the two variants of the model. First, assume that labor market
is perfectly competitive. Equilibrium in the labor market gives
w = Eδ
(
n1
n2
)1−δ
The resulting firm’s profit is equal to
ϕ1(n1, n2) = (1− δ)An
−δ
1 n
ε+δ
2 (2)
The workers (citizens) get utility from consumption and have to bear com-
muting cost.
The basic urban economic model (see, e.g.Black and Henderson [1999]) as-
sumes that the city consists of the Central Business District (CBD), in which all
production occurs, surrounded by the land, occupied by the citizens. The citi-
zens commute to the CBD. In this model, in the city, populated by n2 citizens,
requiring 1 unit of land each, the total commuting costis equ al to TCC = bn
3/2
2 ,
where b = 23pi
−1/2τ , and τ is commuting cost per unit of length. Then, the av-
erage commuting cost is equal to ACC = bn
1/2
2 .
The land rent can be easily accommodated in this setting, since the total
land rent is also proportional to n
3/2
2 , more precisely, TR = (b/2)n
3/2
2 . So, the
average land rent is (b/2)n
1/2
2 . This means that taking into account the land
7Henderson and Becker [2000] assumed that the spillover is determined by the number of
firms: E = Anε
1
. This doesn’t change my results qualitatively. More complicated production
function with capital, human capital, land etc. can be considered. To keep things simple, I
consider a model with only one input.
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rent on top of the commuting cost is just a matter of having coefficient (3/2)b
instead of b in the formulae for ACC.
The worker’s utility is assumed to be linear in money8 and is equal to
ϕ2(n1, n2) = w(n1, n2)− bn
1/2
2 = δAn
1−δ
1 n
ε+δ−1
2 − bn
1/2
2 (3)
Alternatively, I consider the case of rigid labor market, in which wage is fixed
at the level w = w and labor demand is not equal to labor supply. There are two
possibilities: either wage is fixed at the level below the equilibrium, and then
labor supply is abundant; or wage is fixed at the level higher than equilibrium,
which leads to the shortage of labor supply.
For the latter case, n1L
D < n2, and I assume that all the vacancies are
filled, and the firms get their desired amount of labor, whereas each worker
gets a job with probability (n1L
D)/n2. So, worker’s (ex-ante) utility is equal to
w(n1L
D)/n2 − bn
1/2
2 .
This gives
ϕ1(n1, n2) = (1− δ)Kn
ε
1−δ
2 (4)
ϕ2(n1, n2) = δKn1n
ε
1−δ
−1
2 − bn
1/2
2 (5)
where
K = A
(
δA
w
) δ
1−δ
(6)
For the case of lack of labor supply, n1L
D > n2, I assume that labor is split
equally among the firms so that each of them employs n2/n1 workers. The
resulting profits and utilities are given by
ϕ1(n1, n2) = An
−δ
1 n
δ+ε
2 − w
n2
n1
(7)
ϕ2(n1, n2) = w − bn
1/2
2 (8)
The public good consumption, or, more generally the consumption amenities
can easily be incorporated into the citizens’ utility function. For example, for
the case of the competitive labor market, one can consider ϕ2(n1, n2, A,B) =
[w(n1, n2)]
αB1−α or ϕ2(n1, n2, A,B) = w(n1, n2) + B, which are the standard
ways of modeling the public goods consumption.
Notice that the production amenities A influence worker’s wage, and, con-
sequently, citizens’ benefits.
In the benchmark models of two-sided market of Rochet and Tirole [2004]
and Armstrong [2006] the benefits of the actors from joining the platform are
assumed to be linear in the number of the participants on the other side of
platform, i.e. ϕi = binj + ai (bi > 0). This functional form is based on assump-
tion that each member on one side of platform interacts with each member on
another side. These assumptions are too stylized for the purpose of modeling
the city. In fact, the concentration spillover, represented here by ε, plays an
important role in determining the benefits from joining the platform (city), as
8To justify this assumption, notice that the Cobb-Douglas preferences lead to indirect
utility linear in income.
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follows from the three cases, corresponding to the different structures of the la-
bor market, considered as the motivating example above. On top of this, there
is only one interaction between a firm and a worker on the platform. At the
same time, there is a number of similarities. For instance, the benefit of the
user on one side of platform is an increasing function of the number of users
on another side. Because of this, a lot of intuition on the pricing strategies of
the platform, presented in Rochet and Tirole [2004] and Armstrong [2006], is
relevant for the model and the application on this paper.
2.3 Regularity Assumptions
I assume that following regularity conditions on the overall benefits of the
platform users, i.e. firms’ profit and citizens’ wage net of commuting cost,
ϕ1n1 + ϕ2n2, hold:
∂
∂n1
(ϕ1n1 + ϕ2n2) ≥ 0,
∂
∂n2
(ϕ1n1 + ϕ2n2) ≥ 0
∂2
∂n21
(ϕ1n1 + ϕ2n2) ≤ 0,
∂2
∂n22
(ϕ1n1 + ϕ2n2) ≤ 0,
∂2
∂n1n2
(ϕ1n1 + ϕ2n2) ≥ 0
For the examples considered above, for the competitive labor market and for
the rigid labor market for the case of shortage of labor
ϕ1n1 + ϕ2n2 = An
1−δ
1 n
δ+ε
2 − bn
3/2
2
for the rigid labor market when labor is abundant
ϕ1n1 + ϕ2n2 = Kn1n
ε
1−δ
2 − bn
3/2
2
It’s easy to check that with ε + δ < 1 and 0 < δ < 1 all the regularity
assumptions are satisfied for all n1, n2 for both functions. However, in general,
the regularity assumptions are required only for n1, n2, satisfying some condi-
tions (the first order conditions of the corresponding optimization problems).
For instance, in the paper I don’t require that ε+ δ < 1 holds for all n1, n2.
3 Monopoly Platform
In this section I analyze the case of an isolated city which is considered as a
monopoly platform. I follow the general framework for the analysis of the two-
sided market monopoly. However, it’s impossible in the framework of a city
to directly apply the general results of Rochet and Tirole [2004] or Armstrong
[2006] because, as it is shown in the previous section, firms’ and citizens’ benefits
from joining the city are influenced by the concentration externality and can’t
be taken of the forms assumed in these papers. Still, there are many analogies
between the results of my paper and the results of the previous studies.
I start with setting the basic framework for the analysis and proceed then
to the three regimes of city management. The first regime is the active city
management under which the City Manager sets taxes, i.e. acts as an active
platform in the two-sided market. The second regime is passive city management
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or self-organization of a city, when City Manager serves only to organize the
site for a city (in particular, labor matching market) and doesn’t intervene with
taxes. In this case the size of the city is determined by free entry of firms and
citizens. The third regime is the socially optimal city size. I show that it can be
achieved with taxes set at particular level. After analyzing the three regimes, I
compare the three regimes.
Assume that the firms are heterogenous and have an outside option - each
of them may obtain profit pi outside the city. In other words, each firm requires
the after-tax profit at least pi to operate in the city.
Let F1(pi) be the number of firms with required profit less than pi. So, F1(pi)
is analogous to CDF for the random variable pi but it takes values not necessarily
from the interval [0, 1].
The firms entry condition is
ϕ1(n1, n2)− T1 − pi = 0 (9)
n1 = F1(pi) (10)
The two equations determine the firms’ quasi-demand9 for the city (plat-
form)
n1 = D1(T1, n2)
It follows from the definition of function F1 that it is increasing. Conse-
quently, the inverse function F−11 is increasing as well.
Additionally, I assume that the function F1(p̂i)F ′
1
(p̂i) is increasing.
The assumptions for the citizens are similar to those for the firms. Each
(potential) citizen has an outside option - the (indirect) utility level û which he
can obtain outside the city.
Let F2(û) be the number of workers with required utility level less than û.
The workers entry condition is then
ϕ2(n1, n2, B)− T2 − û = 0 (11)
n2 = F2(û) (12)
The two equations determine the workers’ quasi-demand for the city (plat-
form)
n2 = D2(T2, n1)
It follows from the definition of function F2 that it is increasing. Conse-
quently, the inverse function F−12 is increasing as well.
Additionally, I assume that the function F2(û)F ′
2
(û) is increasing.
The two quasi-demand equations can be solved together to give demand for
the city from the firms and citizens:
n1 = N1(T1, T2)
n2 = N2(T1, T2)
I consider now three different regimes of city management.
9I use the term ”quasi-demand” following Rochet and Tirole [2003]. The demand should
depend on the taxes only.
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3.1 The Results for the Monopoly Platform
The City Manager (platform) program is
T1n1 + T2n2 → max
Tj
s.t. n1 = N1(T1, T2)
n2 = N2(T1, T2)
It is convenient to change variables to the threshold utilities û and pi. Substi-
tuting T1 and T2 from the entry conditions (9) and (11) and taking into account
that n1 = F1(pi), n2 = F2(û) gives an equivalent program
(ϕ1(F1(pi), F2(û))− pi)F1(pi) + (ϕ2(F1(pi), F2(û))− û)F2(û) −→ max
p̂i,û
The F.O.C for this program are:
(ϕ′11(·)F
′
1 − 1)F1(pi) + (ϕ1(·)− pi)F
′
1 + ϕ
′
21F
′
1F2(û) = 0
ϕ′12(·)F
′
2F1(pi) + (ϕ
′
22F
′
2 − 1)F2(û) + (ϕ2(·)− û)F
′
2(û) = 0
Rearrangements and changing variables to n1 and n2 leads to the following
result.
Proposition 1. The number of monopoly platform users (city size under active
city management) is determined from the system
∂
∂n1
(ϕ1n1 + ϕ2n2) = F
−1
1 (n1) +
n1
F ′1(F
−1
1 (n1)
(13)
∂
∂n2
(ϕ1n1 + ϕ2n2) = F
−1
2 (n2) + F
−1
2 (n2) +
n2
F ′2(F
−1
2 (n2)
(14)
The entry fees (taxes) are given by
Ti + ϕ
′
jinj
Ti
=
1
ηi
(15)
where i = 1, 2, j 6= i, ϕ′ji =
∂ϕj
∂ni
and ηi = −
TiD
′
i
Di
are the elasticities of the
quasi-demands.
The formula for taxes (15) is analogous to the standard Lerner formula for
the price structure for the two-sided markets which can be written as (see Rochet
and Tirole [2004])
pi − (ci − bj)
pi
=
1
ηi
(16)
where pi is the per-transaction price for side i of the market, ci is platform’s
transaction cost,10 bj is the other side per-transaction benefit. This benefit can
be taxed out by the platform, so bjnj represents the platform’s marginal profit
obtained on side j from a marginal member on side i.
10I assume ci = 0 but non-zero cost can easily be accommodated. Zero transaction cost are
relevant for modeling the city.
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For the considered setting, pi =
Ti
nj
if ”transaction” is broadly understood.
In fact, there is only one transaction between a firm and a worker, resulted from
the job market matching. However, the higher number of, say, workers, may
be thought of leading to more ”transactions”-bargaining about wage between a
firm and all the workers which results in lower wage.
The marginal benefit on side j resulted from the additional member on side
i, represented by ϕ′ji in (15), is a generalization of the per-transaction benefit bj
in (16). So, the formula (15), which describes the price structure for the more
general setting, analyzed in this paper, is a generalization of the ”standard”
formulae (16) for the price structure in the two-sided markets.
Notice that the one-side monopoly with zero cost would set price (Ti) at
the point with demand elasticity equal to 1. The additional term ϕ′jinj in (15)
emphasizes that the two-sided nature of the city plays an important role for the
tax setting of the city manager, and, consequently, affects the size of the city.
3.2 Social Optimum
Social welfare of the firms and citizens located in the city (net of foregone
opportunities) is given by
SW =
F−1
1
(n1)∫
0
(ϕ1(n1, n2)− pi)F
′
1(pi)dpi +
F−1
2
(n2)∫
0
(ϕ2(n1, n2)− u)F
′
2(u)du
The change of variables to (pi, û) leads to a simpler program. Changing then
the variables back to (n1, n2) gives the following result:
Proposition 2. The socially optimal numbers of the backyard firms and citizens
in the city is given by
∂
∂n1
(ϕ1n1 + ϕ2n2) = F
−1
1 (n1) (17)
∂
∂n2
(ϕ1n1 + ϕ2n2) = F
−1
2 (n2) (18)
Proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 has a clear intuition. The left-hand side of (17) represents the
marginal benefit of all firms and citizens in the city resulting from the marginal
firm joining the city. Note that it’s different from the marginal firm’s own benefit
due to presence of the network externality.
The right-hand side of (17) represents the foregone opportunities of the
marginal firm which is equal to the social foregone opportunities. At the opti-
mum, the marginal benefits should equalize the foregone opportunities.
Equation (18) represents the similar cost-benefit relation for the marginal
citizen.
The optimal city size can be achieved through taxation. The taxes which
lead to the optimal city size can be represented by the following formulae:
Ti + ϕ
′
jinj +
Di
F ′i
Ti
=
1
ηi
(i = 1, 2) (19)
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The taxes determined by the system (19) can be considered as Ramsey taxes
for the city. The comparison of (15) and (19) leads to the following
Claim 1. The monopolistic platform (city manager) imposes the entry fees
(taxes) which lead to the socially optimal city size iff the populations of both
firms and citizens are homogenous, i.e. have the same outside options.
3.3 Self-organization of the City
Under self-organization, the city size is determined by the free entry conditions
with zero taxes (9) and (11). The following Proposition can easily be established.
Proposition 3. The city size under the free entry is given by
ϕ1(n1, n2) = F
−1
1 (n1) (20)
ϕ2(n1, n2) = F
−1
2 (n2) (21)
The two equations represent the cost-benefit relations, as for the optimal city
size. However, now these benefits are limited to the own benefits of the marginal
firm and the marginal citizen joined the city and don’t include externalities for
the other firms and citizens. This leads to the deviation from the socially optimal
city size, which are considered below.
3.4 Comparison of the City Management Regimes
First, compare the optimal city size with the one resulting from the active city
management.
Claim 1 states that the city size is optimal iff the firms and the citizens are
homogenous. The higher is heterogeneity in the outside opportunities of the
firms and/or citizens, the higher is the city size distortions. Notice that in (19)
Di = Di(Ti, nj), so that heterogeneity even in one side of the city will lead to
distortion on this side which can be translated to the other side.
The direction of the distortion is easier to see by comparing the city size
characterizations in Propositions 1 and 2.
First, there is an extra term FiF ′i
in the right-hand sides of the two equations
(13) and (14) for the city size under the active city management. These terms
are related to the monopoly position of the city Manager on each side of the
platform. The City Manager wants the marginal firm and the marginal citizen
to have higher benefits from joining to the city to be able to impose higher
taxes. This is the standard monopoly deviation from the efficient outcome: the
monopoly prefers to serve thinner market but impose higher prices, compared
to the social optimum. This effect will be referred to as monopolization effect.
Second, despite the functional forms of the left-hand sides as function of two
variable - n1, n2 are the same, their functional forms as functions of the own side
size ni change because the left-hand sides contain the size of the other side of
the city nj as a parameter, e.g. the left-hand side of the equation for firms (13)
depends on the number of citizens, which changes in equilibrium with active
City Manager, compared to the social optimum. As a consequence, the number
of, say, firms changes not only as a response to the monopolization of the market
for the firms by the City Manager but also as a response to the change in the
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number of the actors on the other side of the market - the citizens. This latter
effect will be referred to as adjustment effect.
So, the overall distortion imposed by the City Manager may be thought of as
a sum of the two effects - the monopolization and the subsequent adjustment11.
To sum up the above discussion, under the active city management, the
monopolization effect appears on each side of the city (platform) and it is related
to the ”own” side of the platform. The adjustment effect arises as a reaction to
the changes on another side of the platform.
n1
adjustment due to
change in n2 monopolization effect
n∗1n
e
1
Lm
L∗
R∗Rm
Figure 1: Distortion in the city size under active city management.
Figure 1 illustrates the changes in the number of firms. Similar figure for
the citizens should be drawn to represent the full picture.
The analysis of the distortions created by the monopolistic platform (active
city manager) can be illustrated by this figure.
In Figure 1, the curve L∗ represents the marginal social benefit from the
marginal firm joining the city. It is described by the left-hand side of (17)
and is a decreasing functions of n1 because
∂2
∂n2
1
(ϕ1n1 + ϕ2n2) ≤ 0, according
to the regularity assumptions. The curve R∗ represents the foregone social
opportunities (i.e. the outside option) of the marginal firm. It is described
by the right-hand side of (17) and is an increasing function of n1 since F
−1
1 is
increasing functions and F1F ′
1
is assumed to be increasing.
11After the changes resulted from the monopolization effect, there will be the first round
of adjustment. This will lead, however, to another change in, say, n1, which will lead to the
second round of adjustment in n2, and so on. So, in fact there will be infinitely many rounds
of adjustment with decreasing magnitude which will result in the overall adjustment after the
reaction to the distortion initiated by the monopolization effect.
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The optimal city size is determined by the intersection of the curves L∗ and
R∗, which gives the number of the firms n∗1.
Similar figure for the citizens gives the socially optimal number of the citizens
n∗2.
The distortion created by the monopolistic platform (active city manager)
can be illustrated in the following way. First, the curve R∗ shifts upward to the
position Rm due to the monopolization effect. This shift decreases n1 at the
intersection. However, similar shift takes place for the citizens and lead to the
decrease in n2. This, however, leads to the change in the left-hand side of (17),
which is illustrated by the shift of the curve L∗. Since ∂
2
∂n1n2
(ϕ1n1 + ϕ2n2) ≥ 0,
according to the regularity assumptions, the decrease in n2 leads to the down-
ward shift of the curve L∗ in Figure 1. This first step of the adjustment for
the firms will in turn affect the citizens which will lead to a decrease in n2.
This leads to the subsequent second step of adjustment for the firms - further
downward shift of the curve L∗ etc. After all (in fact, infinite number) steps of
adjustment, the city sizes n1, n2 the curves L on the two graphs - Figure 1 and
similar figure for the number of the citizens will reach their final positions Lm
and the equilibrium city size under active city management will be obtained at
the intersection of the curves Lm and Rm, which will lead to the city size nm1 .
Notice that all the shifts lead to the decrease of ni. So, for the active city
management, the equilibrium city size will be suboptimal. The geometrical
argument presented above can easily be formalized to the algebraic proof, so
that the following claim can be established.
Claim 2. The number of the firms and the citizens under the active city man-
agement is suboptimal if the firms or the citizens are heterogenous (in terms of
the outside option).
Second, compare the optimal city size with the free entry outcome.
The marginal firm and citizen own benefit from joining the city can be clearly
distinguished from the social benefits if (17) and (18) will be rewritten as:
ϕi + ϕ
′
ii + ϕ
′
jinj = F
−1
i (ni) (i = 1, 2) (22)
The first term in the left-hand sides of (22) represents the own benefits of
the marginal firm (marginal citizen), the two other terms in the left-had side
represent the externalities.
Compare (22) with the free entry city size characterization in Proposition
3. The right-hand sides are the same and the shift in the left-hand sides is
determined by the sign of ϕ′ii + ϕ
′
jinj which is, however, unclear because the
sign of the first term is unclear. The detailed analysis for the particular case of
the rigid labor market is conducted in the subsection 3.5.
However, it’s clear that the mechanisms of the deviation from the optimal
city size are different for the active and passive city management.
For the active city management, the deviation emerges due to the monopo-
lization effect and the subsequent adjustment. The externalities from joining an
additional member on one side of the platform on another side of the platform
are taken into account by the city manager. By contrast, for the free entry under
the passive city management, the deviation from the optimal city size appears
because of disregarding of the externalities. In the context of the two-sided
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market framework, this means that the entry decision of the platform members
are shaped by the one-sided considerations only.
The result is different from the City Developer model of Henderson and
Becker [2000]. In their model, the city size under the active city management
is optimal whereas it is sub-optimal under free entry. However, unlike the City
Manager framework of this paper, the City Developer framework is based on
the maximization of the land rent collected in the city net of the subsidies payed
to the firms and citizens.
3.5 Application
Consider the model of the city with competitive labor market, described in
subsection 2.2. The socially optimal size of the city (nSO1 , n
SO
2 ) is determined,
according to Proposition 2 by the system of equations
Ψ1(n1, n2) ≡ A(1− δ)n
−δ
1 n
ε+δ
2 = F
−1
1 (n1) (23)
Ψ2(n1, n2) ≡ A(ε+ δ)n
1−δ
1 n
ε+δ−1
2 −
3
2
bn
1/2
2 = F
−1
2 (n2) (24)
Under the active city management, the size is determined by the system of
equations with the same left-hand sides and disturbed right-hand sides, accord-
ing to Proposition 1. However, if the firms and the citizens are homogenous,
there is no disturbance and the size of the city under the active management is
socially optimal. Otherwise, the city is suboptimal.
Under the free entry regime, for the case of the competitive labor market,
the city size (nfe1 , n
fe
2 ) is determined by Proposition 3 which gives the system
of equations
Φ1(n1, n2) ≡ A(1 − δ)n
−δ
1 n
ε+δ
2 = F
−1
1 (n1) (25)
Φ2(n1, n2) ≡ Aδn
1−δ
1 n
ε+δ−1
2 − bn
1/2
2 = F
−1
2 (n2) (26)
Compare now the socially optimal city size and the city size under free entry.
The first equations of the two systems, (23) and (25), coincide since Ψ1(·) =
Φ1(·) whereas the second equations, (24) and (26), differ. The comparison of
the functions Ψ2 and Φ2 gives the following result:
Lemma 1. For each n1 there exists a threshold n̂2 determined by
n̂
3/2−ε−δ
2 =
2Aεn1−δ1
b
such that
Φ2(n1, n2) < Ψ2(n1, n2) for n2 < n̂2
Φ2(n1, n2) > Ψ2(n1, n2) for n2 > n̂2
Proof is given in the Appendix.
Restrict now attention to the case of the homogenous outside options for
the firms and the citizens. In this case, the right-hand sides of (23)-(26) are
constants.
The analysis is easier to do with the help of the graph. In Figure 2 the
curves SO and fe represents Ψ2(n
SO
1 , n2) and Φ2(n
SO
1 , n2) as functions of n2.
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n2n̂2suboptimal city overoptimal city
fe
SO
û low
û high
strong heterogeneity
weak heterogeneity
Figure 2: Distortion in the city size under passive city management with com-
petitive labor market. Curve SO corresponds to the social optimum (function
Ψ2(·, n2)), curve fe corresponds to the the free entry (function Φ2(·, n2))
According to Lemma 1, for small n2 the curve fe lies below the curve SO; for
large n2 the relative position of the two curves changes. The two horizontal
lines û low and û high represent the cases of low and high outside option for
the firms.
It is easy to see from Figure 2 that if outside option for the citizens is
low, there will be upward distortion in the number of citizens. This will lead
to the upward shift for the function Φ1, as compared to Ψ1. Put formally,
Φ1(n1, n2) > Ψ1(n1, n
SO
2 ) for n2 > n
SO
2 . As a result, the distortion in n2 will
lead to the distortion in n1, oriented in the same direction. This, in turn, will
strength the distortion in n2 etc. At the end, the distorted city of the size
nfe1 , n
fe
2 will emerge.
The argument presented above means that the direction of the overall dis-
tortion, i.e. the direction of shift from nSOi to n
fe
i is determined by the direction
of the initial shift in n2.
This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that for low outside option city size
will be overoptimal, whereas the high outside option leads to suboptimal city
size.
The argument for the homogenous outside option can be generalized to the
case of the heterogenous outside option. It’s easy to see from Figure 2 that both
overoptimality and suboptimality of the city size (if this is the case) become less
pronounced.
Finally, since an increase in the concentration spillover ε increases the thresh-
old n̂2, according to Lemma 1, it’s more likely to have suboptimal city size for
the cities based on the industries with high concentration spillover.
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4 Competing Platforms (Cities)
In this section I consider the case when the two cities (platforms) compete for
the firms and citizens.
I consider the tax setting of the City Managers and generalize the results of
Armstrong [2006]. I also consider stability of the two-cities configuration. When
this configuration isn’t stable, there will be formed one agglomerated city12.
Consider the two cities13 located at two ends of [0, 1] Hotelling line. The
cities will be referred to as ”Left” and ”Right”. All the values related to the
Left city will be indexed by ”L”. The ones for the Right city - by R. The
transportation costs for producers and citizens are tj (j = 1, 2).
Let the firms and the workers be distributed uniformly along [0, 1]. As before,
each city manager decides on two tax levels - for firms and for citizens.
4.1 Competing Platforms equilibrium
The firm located at x chooses to be in city L rather than R iff
ϕ1(n
L
1 , n
L
2 ;A
L, BL)− TL1 − t1x ≥ ϕ1(n
R
1 , n
R
2 ;A
R, BR)− TR1 − t1(1− x)
Similarly, the condition for the citizens is
ϕ2(n
L
1 , n
L
2 ;A
L, BL)− TL2 − t2x ≥ ϕ2(n
R
1 , n
R
2 ;A
R, BR)− TR2 − t2(1− x)
Consider the market sharing case14. Then, nRj = 1−n
L
j and demand for the
city L is determined by
nL1 =
1
2
+
ϕ1(L)− ϕ1(R)
2t1
−
TL1 − T
R
1
2t1
(27)
nL2 =
1
2
+
ϕ2(L)− ϕ2(R)
2t2
−
TL2 − T
R
2
2t2
(28)
where
ϕj(L) = ϕj(n
L
1 , n
L
2 ;A
L, BL)
ϕj(R) = ϕj(n
R
1 , n
R
2 ;A
R, BR) = ϕj(1− n
L
1 , 1− n
L
2 ;A
R, BR)
Equations (27) and (28) determine the demand functions for the Left city
nLj = D
L
j (T
L
1 , T
L
2 ;T
R
1 , T
R
2 ) in an implicit way. Similarly, they determine the
demand for the Right city.
For the future purposes it is useful to compute the derivatives of the quasi-
demand functions NLi (T
L
1 , T
L
2 ), i.e. the demands D
L
i (T
L
1 , T
L
2 ;T
R
1 , T
R
2 ) where
the Right city’s decisions on taxes TRj are taken as given.
Denote by N ′ij the partial derivative of the function Ni(T1, T2) with respect
to Tj :
N ′ij =
∂Ni
∂Tj
=
∂Di(T
L
1 , T
L
2 ;T
R
1 , T
R
2 )
∂TLj
12Of course, spillover shouldn’t be too large compared to the commuting cost to avoid city
explosion.
13To be more precise, I consider the two sites, on which the two cities can emerge.
14The conditions for such equilibrium to exist will be given below for the case of the cities
with identical amenities.
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and by ϕ′ij the partial derivative of the function ϕi with respect to nj :
ϕ′ij =
∂ϕi
∂nj
The derivatives N ′ij can be obtained by differentiating the system of equa-
tions (27)− (28) with respect to TL1 and T
L
2 .
Lemma 2. The derivatives of the quasidemand functions N1, N2 are given by
N ′11 =
d
D
, N ′21 = −
c
D
, N ′12 = −
b
D
, N ′22 =
a
D
where
a = a(N1, N2) = ϕ
′
11(L) + ϕ
′
11(R)− 2t1; b = b(N1, N2) = ϕ
′
12(L) + ϕ
′
12(R)
c = c(N1, N2) = ϕ
′
21(L) + ϕ
′
21(R); d = d(N1, N2) = ϕ
′
22(L) + ϕ
′
22(R)− 2t2
D = ad− bc
Proof is given in the Appendix.
Notice that the coefficient a, b, c, d depend on the city size but are symmetric,
i.e. the same for the two cities, even if the cities are asymmetric which can be
the case if they have different amenities.
Consider the decision making of the city L manager, taken city R taxes as
given. In what follows the index L will be omitted to simplify notation whereas
index R will be kept.
The City Manager program is
T1N1(T1, T2) + T2N2(T1, T2)→ max
T1,T2
which gives the first order conditions
N ′11T1 +N1 +N
′
21T2 = 0 (29)
N ′22T2 +N2 +N
′
12T1 = 0 (30)
Substituting here N ′ij from Lemma 2, we obtain the Best Response functions
in implicit way, since Nj are functions of T1, T2:
dT1 − cT2 = −N1D
−bT1 + aT2 = −N2D
The solution of this system gives the Best Response taxes as implicit func-
tions in a more structured way:
T1 = −aN1 − cN2 (31)
T2 = −bN1 − dN2 (32)
where Nj are considered as functions of taxes in own and another city:
Nj = Dj(T1, T2;T
R
1 , T
R
2 ).
Clearly, the first order conditions (29)− (30) and the formulae for the taxes
(31) − (32) are only necessary conditions. To make sure that the solution to
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the system (29)− (30) will in fact maximize the objective function, one should
check the corresponding second order conditions.
Notice, that up to this point it wasn’t assumed that the two cities have
identical amenities, so the formulae for the cities sizes (27) and (28) and for
taxes (31) and (32) hold even for the case of cities with different amenities.
I restrict now the analysis to the case of the cities with identical amenities.
Consider the two sites for the cities with the same amenities. In other
words, the two sites are ex-ante identical. In general, the are two possibilities.
Either the two sites will be developed into the cities. In this case the two
symmetric cities emerge15 and there will be symmetric equilibrium. Or one site
will corner all the firms and workers and one agglomerated city will emerge.
This equilibrium can be called ”agglomeration equilibrium”.
The following Proposition generalizes the results of Armstrong [2006] on the
existence of the market-sharing equilibrium and the pricing strategies of the
platforms.
Proposition 4. The symmetric market sharing equilibrium exists iff16
t1 > ϕ
′
11 (33)
t2 > ϕ
′
22 (34)
4 (t1 − ϕ
′
11) (t2 − ϕ
′
22) > (ϕ
′
12 + ϕ
′
21)
2
(35)
Equilibrium entry fees (taxes) are given by
T1 = t1 − ϕ
′
11 − ϕ
′
21 (36)
T2 = t2 − ϕ
′
12 − ϕ
′
22 (37)
where ϕ′ij ≡ ϕ
′
ij(
1
2 ,
1
2 ).
Proof is given in the Appendix.
Clearly, we need only one of the conditions (33) or (34) together with (35)
because if one of (33) or (34) holds, another holds as well given (35).
Armstrong [2006] considered a similar model which is motivated by applica-
tion to such two-sided markets as ”nightclubs, shopping malls and newspapers”.
In the single-homing case he considered the functions ϕj of a simpler form, com-
pared to my model, for instance ϕ1 depends only on n2 and ϕ2 depends only
on n1 and the two functions are linear. On the other hand, Armstrong assumed
that there are costs for the platform of serving the users at the platform (firms
and workers in my case, in Armstrong - e.g. supermarket buyers and suppliers)
which are assumed to be zero in my analysis. The assumption of zero cost is not
crucial for my results and can be easily relaxed. Though, it is relevant for mod-
eling the city. His result on the equilibrium taxes (prices in his model) is then
a particular case of my analysis. Moreover, considering the simpler functions
requires much less technique. So, my analysis in this part is a generalization of
the Armstrong’s analysis of the single-homing case.
My results have clear economic intuition. As in standard Hotelling model, tj
represents market power. The derivative ϕ′11 is negative or zero in the examples
15The possibility for asymmetric equilibrium in which both cities have non-infinitesimal size
can also studied
16Despite these are second order conditions, there is no second order derivatives of the
functions ϕj because they cancel out due to symmetricity of the considered equilibrium.
18
I consider. It reflects the fact that additional members on the own side decrease
benefits from joining the city. This is attributed, in particular, to the worse
matching opportunities. The term (−ϕ′11), taken for the marginal firm, increases
the tax T1, making the city ”less attractive” for the firms, located farther than
the marginal one but keeping at the same time the city attractive enough for
the firms located in the city as the increased tax controls the number of firms
joined to the city. Finally, the terms −ϕ′21 corrects the tax upward because the
higher number of the firms makes the city more attractive for the citizens.
The interpretation of the components of the tax T2 is similar. It’s, however,
worth to notice that the term ϕ′22 can be positive because the concentration
spillover appears due to the concentration of the workers. So, the tax for the
citizens is corrected downward twice. This is resulted from the fact that each
City Manager is more prone to attract more workers-citizens as they create the
spillover and the two City Managers compete for the citizens tougher than for
the firms.
4.2 Application - the Role of Spillover and Labor Market
Structure
I turn now to the application of the general result stated in Proposition 4 to the
models of city with competitive and rigid labor market.
4.2.1 Competitive Labor Market
For the case of competitive labor market, substituting (2) and (3) into Propo-
sition 4 gives the following results. The taxes in the city are
T1 = t1 (38)
T2 = τ −Aε2
1−ε (39)
where τ = t2 +
b√
2
can be thought of as general congestion cost for the citizens
(a sum of transportation cost and land rent).
The conditions for the existence of the 2-city equilibrium are:
t1 > −(1− δ)δA · 2
1−ε (40)
τ > −δ(1− ε− δ)A · 21−ε (41)
4
(
t1 +A(1− δ)δ · 2
1−ε) (τ +Aδ(1− ε− δ) · 21−ε) >
>
(
A(1 − δ)(ε+ 2δ) · 21−ε
)2 (42)
The inequality (40) holds, given that δ < 1. So, the necessary and suffi-
cient condition for the second order conditions to hold reduces to (42). After
rearrangement it leads to
t1τ · 2
2(ε−1) +Aδ ((t1 + τ)(1 − δ)− t1ε) 2
ε−1 >
> A2(1− δ)
(
1− δ
4
ε2 + δε
)
(43)
So, we have established the following result.
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Claim 3. 1. For the two competing cities with competitive labor market, the
taxes are given by (38) and (39).
2. The necessary and sufficient condition for the two-city equilibrium to exist
is given by (43).
The spillover, the two-sided nature of the city and amenities all play an
important role for both tax setting and existence of the 2-city configuration.
In fact, the ”one-side” taxes are given by Ti = ti. When the city is considered
as the two-sided market, in the formula for tax on the firms, the additional com-
ponents −ϕ′11 − ϕ
′
21 cancel out, which is an artefact of the particular functional
form of the production technology; for the tax on the citizens, the additional
component −ϕ′12 − ϕ
′
22 is non-trivial in (39).
The two-sided nature of the city is also important for the existence of the
2-city equilibrium. Notice that it’s possible to have the two second order con-
ditions ∂
2T
∂T 2j
< 0, given by (40) and (41), satisfied, but the hessian matrix still
not to be negative-semidefinite. This means that the possible instability of the
2-city configuration is due to the two-sided nature of the city. In fact, if one
of the taxes is kept constant, there is no profitable deviation through changing
another tax only, because the individual second order derivatives are negative.
The profitable deviation can, however, exist is the two taxes are changed simul-
taneously - tax for one side increases, and tax for another side decreases holding
a particular ratio of the changes in the taxes17.
The role of spillover should be clear from (39) and (43). For the spillover
intensity ε, it’s clear from (39) that stronger spillover intensity decreases the
tax on the citizens18. In other words, spillover makes competition between city
managers for the citizens (whose concentration creates the spillover) more tight.
The inspection of (43) shows that for ε = 0 the left-hand side is positive,
and the right-hand side is equal to zero, so that (43) holds. As ε increases, the
right-hand side can grow faster than the left-hand side, so that it’s possible to
have the inequality (43) violated for some values of ε. This is illustrated by
Figure 3.
Finally, the role of production amenities A can be understood from (39) and
(43). Higher A leads to lower taxes on the citizens and can destroy the 2-city
equilibrium.
The tax revenues collected in each city, which can be considered as a char-
acteristic of political power of the City Manager, is given by
T =
t1 + τ
2
−Aε · 2−ε
which a decreasing function of spillover intensity when it’s small enough and is
a decreasing function of amenities A.
The comparative static results are summarized in the following claim.
Claim 4. For the competing cities with competitive labor market, governed by
the active city manager
17It can be shown that deviation from the taxes given by the first order conditions can be
profitable only if it has a described structure.
18In fact, tax in (39) is a non-monotone function of ε. However, for ε small enough, which
is the case for the existing industries, the function of ε in (39) is decreasing.
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εε1 ε2
Right-hand side
Left-hand side
Figure 3: Inequality (43) with A = 1.7, t1 = .1, τ = 2, δ = .25
1. The taxes on the (qualified) workers are lower for the cities, based on the
industries with stronger concentration spillover.
2. The cities agglomerate to form a larger city more often when concentration
spillover is stronger.
4.2.2 Rigid Labor Market
I focus on the case when wage w is fixed on the higher than equilibrium level.
Then there will be excessive labor supply, n1L
D < n2, which is equivalent
to Aδ/w > 2ε. Substitution of the benefits from joining the city for the firms
and citizens given by (4) and (5) to Proposition 4 gives
T1 = t1 − 2Kδ · 2
− ε
1−δ (44)
T2 = τ + 2K
(
δ −
ε
1− δ
)
· 2−
ε
1−δ (45)
The conditions for the existence of the 2-cities equilibrium are:
t1 > 0
τ > 2δK(
ε
1− δ
− 1) · 2−
ε
1−δ
t1τ − 2t1δK
(
ε
1− δ
− 1
)
· 2−
ε
1−δ > K2(ε+ δ)2 · 2−
2ε
1−δ (46)
Clearly, the first inequality always holds. So, the necessary and sufficient
condition for the second order conditions to hold reduces to the last inequality.
So, we have established following
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Claim 5. For the two competing cities with rigid labor market, when wage is
fixed on the higher than equilibrium level, the taxes are given by (44) and (45).
The necessary and sufficient condition for the two-city equilibrium to exist
is given by (46).
Again, as for the competitive labor market, the two-sided nature of the
city, spillover and amenities affect the tax setting and existence of the 2-city
equilibrium.
Notice, however, that the rigidity of the labor market changes the impact of
these factors.
The firms now take the whole benefit from the concentration spillover (for
the competitive labor market, the benefit was shared with the workers through
wage increase due to labor market competition). However, attracting more
firms in the cities means increasing the chances for the citizens to be employed.
This determines the competition of the city managers for the firms and explains
the deviation from the ”one-sided” tax: the tax on the firms decreases, which
reflects the tighter competition.
The city manager isn’t interested in attracting additional citizens in the con-
sidered case, because all the firms’ vacancies are filled. So, attracting additional
citizens will make worse off those who are already in the city, as a consequence,
the taxes on the citizens should be lowered. So, in this case the citizens are
heavily taxed.
The stronger spillover intensity increases the tax on the firms, as it increases
the firms’ profit, which isn’t shared with the workers now. It decreases the tax
on the citizens since the firms’ labor demand increases and the citizens have
more chances to be employed, so that the City Managers compete for attracting
more citizens tighter.
Finally, the stronger spillover intensity can destroy the 2-city equilibrium,
similar to the case of competitive labor market.
The overall city tax revenues when the 2-city equilibrium exists, is given by
T =
t1 + τ
2
−K
ε
1− δ
· 2−
ε
1−δ
which is a decreasing function of the spillover intensity ε.
The following Claim summarizes the result of the comparative static analysis.
Claim 6. For the competing cities with rigid labor market, governed by the
active city manager
1. The taxes on the (qualified) workers are lower and the taxes on the firms
are higher for the cities, based on the industries with stronger concentra-
tion spillover.
2. The cities agglomerate to form a larger city more often when concentration
spillover is stronger.
4.2.3 The Impact of the Labor Market Structure on Taxes and Ag-
glomeration
In this part of the paper I compare the taxes set by the City Manager and the
stability of the City configuration under the two structures of the labor market
22
- competitive and rigid. For the case of the rigid labor market I focus on the
voluntary unemployment (higher than equilibrium wage) case.
First, compare the taxes on firms and on citizens. According to (38) and
(44), the taxes on firms for the competitive and rigid labor market are given,
correspondingly by
T c1 = t1, T
r
1 = t1 − 2δK · 2
− ε
1−δ
and the taxes on the citizens, according to (39) and (45) are
T c2 = τ − 2εA · 2
−ε, T r2 = τ + 2
(
δ −
ε
1− δ
)
K · 2−
ε
1−δ
It’s clear that T c1 > T
r
1 . In other words, the cities compete tighter for the
firms under the rigid labor market. In fact, attracting an additional firm under
the rigid labor market, creates the benefit for another side of the platform, since
the citizens will have better chances to be employed. This makes competition
for the firms between the cities tighter.
It’s also easy to see that, at least for small ε, T c2 < T
r
2 . Put differently,
under the competitive labor market, the cities’ competition for the citizens (the
factor creating the concentration spillover) is stronger, than under the rigid
labor market.
As for the firms, the explanation is based on the analysis of the benefits
for another side of the platform. An additional citizen under the competitive
labor market increases the concentration spillover, i.e. all the workers become
more productive, which benefits the firms. On top on this, an additional citizen
increases labor supply and decreases wage, which creates an additional benefit
for the firms, but only under competitive labor market. Finally, under rigid labor
market, attracting an additional citizen would increase congestion (i.e. decrease
the citizens’ chances to be employed), which would weaken the citizens’ benefit
from joining the city. Because of this, city managers compete less tightly for
the citizens under the rigid labor market.
So, we have established the following Claim.
Claim 7. When the 2-city configuration is stable under both competitive and
rigid labor market, the taxes on firms are higher under competitive labor market,
whereas the taxes on human capital are higher under rigid labor market.
Second, compare the stability of the 2-city equilibrium, or, looking from
another angle, when the 2 cities agglomerate into one big city. It’s based on the
comparison of (43) and (46) and leads to the following result.
Claim 8. Agglomeration appears more often under rigid labor market.
Proof is given in the Appendix.
The conclusion on agglomeration seems to be inline with the evidence. The
labor market is more rigid in the developing countries. And, at least for the last
40-50 years, the agglomeration process was most pronounced in the developing
countries - see, e.g., Abdel-Rahman and Anas [2004].
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5 Conclusion
It is generally accepted that increasing returns to scale are essential to explain
the agglomeration of economic activities in the cities. In Krugman [1991] in-
creasing returns play an important role in explaining production concentration.
Scotchmer and Thisse [1992] state that the essential role of increasing returns
to scale is the ”Folk Theorem” of the economic geography. Increasing returns
in production, given imperfect competition on the final good market, translates
into increasing returns in the firms profits.
There can be different mechanisms behind increasing returns. They can
emerge at individual firm level because of non-zero fixed cost - see Spence [1976],
Dixit and Stiglitz [1977], Krugman [1991] or workers’ increased productivity due
to specialization as in Duranton [1998]. It is also possible that each firm has
constant returns to scale but due to concentration, increasing returns emerge at
the industry level. The underlying mechanism can be knowledge accumulation -
see Romer [1986], knowledge generation - see Jacobs [1969], knowledge and ideas
diffusion - see Jovanovic and Rob [1989] and information spillover - see Fujita
and Ogawa [2005], Imai [2005]. The ”creative” side of the cities (as opposed to
the production) is becoming more and more important - see Florida [2003] for
a survey.
This paper relies on the increasing returns, but it also demonstrates that
the multi-sided nature of the city plays an important role in the decisions of the
City Manager on taxation of the firms and citizens. Together with concentration
spillover, the multi-sided nature of the city is important for the agglomeration
of the economic activity.
The paper also demonstrates that the labor market structure in the city is
crucial for both agglomeration of economic activities and taxation of the city
manager.
The model of the paper is best suited for the analysis of the medium-size
cities, which are typically based on only one industry (see Henderson [1997]).
Clearly, the model of this paper has some limitations. For instance, it should
be modified to capture the important distinctive characteristic of mega-cities,
based on many industries and in which the interaction between these industries
(through the markets of the production factors, or externalities) are crucial for
the productions as well as for the citizens.
The framework of this paper can be further extended. For example, a multi-
factor production technology with capital, human capital, raw labor, others
inputs can be considered. An important characteristic of the firms is that they
can multihome, i.e. operate in different cities, unlike most of the others produc-
tion factors.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The number of firms in the city is related to the value of outside option of
the marginal firm: n1 = F1(pi). Similarly, the number of citizens is determined
by n2 = F2(û). With the change of variables (n1, n2)→ (pi, û) we obtain
SW =
p̂i∫
0
(ϕ1(F1(pi), F2(û))− pi)F
′
1(pi)dpi +
+
û∫
0
(ϕ2(F1(pi), F2(û))− u)F
′
2(u)du =
= ϕ1 (F1(pi), F2(û)) · [F
′
1(pi)]
p̂i
0 −
p̂i∫
0
piF ′1(pi)dpi +
+ϕ2 (F1(pi), F2(û)) · [F
′
2(u)]
û
0 −
û∫
0
uF ′2(u)du
So, the Socially optimal values for the outside options for the marginal firm
and marginal citizen should solve the following program
ϕ1 (F1(pi), F2(û))F1(pi)−
p̂i∫
0
piF ′1(pi)dpi +
+ϕ2 (F1(pi), F2(û))F2(û)−
û∫
0
uF ′2(u)du −→ max
p̂i,û
(47)
Written in this form, social welfare has clear economic interpretation. The
first term ϕ1(·)F1(pi) (= ϕ1(·)n1) represents the overall profit of the city firms.
The term ϕ2(·)F2(û) (= ϕ2(·)n2) represents citizens’ overall utility. The inte-
grals represent the foregone outside opportunities. So, the whole expression
represents the society net gains from joining to the city of the part of the pop-
ulations of firms and citizens.
Maximization with respect to (pi, û) gives
(ϕ′11(·)F
′
1F1(pi) + ϕ1(·)F
′
1)− piF
′
1 + ϕ
′
21F
′
1F2(û) = 0
ϕ′12(·)F
′
2F1(pi) + ϕ
′
22F
′
2F2(û) + ϕ2(·)F
′
2(û)− ûF
′
2 = 0
where ϕ′jk =
∂ϕj
∂nk
After rearrangements this gives characterization of the socially optimal size
of the city (number of firms and citizens).
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Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The inequality Φ2(n1, n2) < Ψ2(n1, n2) can be written as
Aδn1−δ1 n
ε+δ−1
2 − bn
1/2
2 < A(ε+ δ)n
1−δ
1 n
ε+δ−1
2 −
3
2
bn
1/2
2
which simplifies to 12bn
1/2
2 < Aεn
1−δ
1 n
ε+δ−1
2 , which gives after simple rearrange-
ments the inequality of the Lemma.
Solution to the program of subsection 3.5
The maximization program is
T (n1, n2) = An
1−δ
1 n
ε+δ
2 − bn
3/2
2 − pin1 − un2 → maxn1,n2
The First Order Conditions:
T ′1 = A(1 − δ)n
−δ
1 n
ε+δ
2 − pi = 0
T ′2 = A(ε+ δ)δn
1−δ
1 n
(ε+δ−1)
2 −
3
2
bn
1/2
2 − u = 0
The 2-nd order derivatives:
T ′′11 = −A(1− δ)δn
−δ−1
1 n
ε+δ
2
T ′′22 = A(ε+ δ)(ε+ δ − 1)n
1−δ
1 n
(ε+δ−2)
2 −
3
4
bn
−1/2
2
T ′′12 = A(1− δ)(ε+ δ)δn
−δ
1 n
ε+δ−1
2
The second order conditions T ′′11 < 0 always holds, given that δ < 1; T
′′
22 < 0
holds for all n1, n2 if ε+δ < 1. However, even if ε+δ > 1, the condition T
′′
22 < 0
can hold for n1, n2 satisfying the first order conditions. Finally, T
′′
11T
′′
22−(T
′′
12)
2 >
0 leads to
3
4
bδ −A(ε+ δ)εn1−δ1 n
ε+δ−3/2
2 > 0
which is the necessary and sufficient condition for the finite city to exist.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Differentiate (27) and (28) on TL1 . This gives the following equalities:
aN ′11 + bN
′
21 ≡ 1 (48)
cN ′11 + dN
′
21 ≡ 0 (49)
Its solution gives the two first formulas of the proposition.
By differentiating equations 27 and 28 with respect to TL2 we obtain the
system
aN ′12 + bN
′
22 ≡ 0 (50)
cN ′12 + dN
′
22 ≡ 1 (51)
The solution of this system gives the two last formulas of the Proposition.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. If the symmetric equilibrium exists, the taxes are determined by the first
order conditions (31) and (32). In the symmetric case
N1 = N2 =
1
2
(52)
a = 2Aϕ′11 − 2t1 , b = 2Aϕ
′
12 , c = 2ϕ
′
21 , d = 2ϕ
′
22 − 2t2 (53)
where all the derivatives of functions ϕ are taken at (N1, N2) = (
1
2 ,
1
2 ). Substi-
tuting these expressions into (31) and (32), we obtain (36) and (37).
To obtain the existence condition, we should consider the second order con-
ditions. The second order derivatives are computed from (29) and (30). Denote
T (T1, T2) = T1N1(T1, T2) + T2N2(T1, T2)
For the general case
∂2T
∂T 21
= 2N ′11 + T1N
′′
111 + T2N211 (54)
∂2T
∂T1∂T2
= N ′12 +N
′
21 + T1N
′′
112 + T2N
′′
212 (55)
∂2T
∂T 22
= 2N ′22 + T1N
′′
122 + T2N222 (56)
For the symmetric case all the second order derivatives of Nj are equal to
zero at (1/2, 1/2).
To obtain this result, first notice that for all the functions a, b, c, d the deriva-
tives on Nj at (1/2, 1/2) are equal to zero:
∂ω(N1, N2)
∂Nj
|( 1
2
, 1
2
) = 0
for ω(·, ·) = a(·, ·), b(·, ·), c(·, ·), d(·, ·)
In fact, the derivatives can be computed from the definitions of the functions
a, b, c, d in Lemma 2. Consider, for example the function a(N1, N2):
a(N1, N2) = A
Lϕ′11(L)+A
Rϕ′11(R)−2t1 ≡ A
Lϕ′11(N1, N2)+A
Rϕ′11(1−N1, 1−N2)−2t1
Differentiating this with respect to N1 gives
∂a
∂N1
= ALϕ′′111(L)−A
Rϕ′′111(R)
for the symmetric cities AL = AR and ϕ′′111(L) = ϕ
′′
111(R) = ϕ
′′
111(1/2, 1/2), so
∂a
∂N1
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
= 0
All the other derivatives are computed in the same way.
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Now consider the equalities (48) and (49). By differentiating them with
respect to T1 we obtain
19
(a′1N
′
11 + a
′
2N
′
21)N
′
11 + aN
′′
111 + (b
′
1N
′
11 + b
′
2N
′
21)N
′
21 + bN
′′
211 ≡ 0
(c′1N
′
11 + c
′
2N
′
21)N
′
11 + cN
′′
111 + (d
′
1N
′
11 + d
′
2N
′
21)N
′
21 + dN
′′
211 ≡ 0
At the symmetric equilibrium point it is simplified to
aN ′′111
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
+ bN ′′211
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
= 0
cN ′′111
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
+ dN ′′211
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
= 0
The solution of this system is
N ′′111
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
= 0 , N ′′211
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
= 0
By differentiating the equalities (48) and (49) with respect to T2 we obtain
N ′′112
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
= 0 , N ′′212
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
= 0
By considering in the same way the equalities (50) and (51) we obtain the
four other second order derivatives:
N ′′121
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
= 0 , N ′′221
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
= 0 , N ′′122
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
= 0 , N ′′222
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
= 0
Go back now to the second derivatives of the objective function (54)-(56).
They can be simplified to
∂2T
∂T 21
= 2N ′11;
∂2T
∂T1∂T2
= N ′12 +N
′
21;
∂2T
∂T 22
= 2N ′22
and rewritten by using Lemma 2:
∂2T
∂T 21
= 2
d
D
;
∂2T
∂T1∂T2
= −
b+ c
D
;
∂2T
∂T 22
= 2
a
D
The condition for the Hessian matrix to be negative semi-definite are:
d
D
≤ 0 or
a
D
≤ 0
4ad− (b+ c)2 > 0
It easy to see that by using (b + c)2 > 2bc we obtain 4ad > (b + c)2 =
b2 + c2 + 2bc > 4bc which means D = ad − bc > 0 So, the first two conditions
for the Hessian matrix can be simplified to
d ≤ 0 or a ≤ 0
which gives the statement of the Proposition after substituting the values of the
functions a, b, c, d in symmetric equilibrium from (53).
19for the variable x, x′j means the derivative with respect to the argument j, i.e. a
′
1
means
∂a
∂N1
whereas N ′
11
∂N1
∂T1
etc.
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Proof of Claim 8
Proof. The conditions for stability of the 2-city configuration for the competitive
and rigid labor market are given by (43) and (46), which can be rewritten as:
t1τ + 2δt1(1− δ − ε)
[
A · 2−ε
]
+ 2Aδτ(1 − δ) · 2−ε >
> (1 − δ)(ε+ δ)2
[
A · 2−ε
]2
−A2(1 − δ)δ(δ − 2ε+ ε2) · 2−2ε
(57)
(1− δ)t1τ + 2δt1(1− δ − ε)
[
K · 2−
ε
1−δ
]
>
> (1− δ)(ε+ δ)2
[
K · 2−
ε
1−δ
]2 (58)
Taking into account that for the case of wage higher than equilibrium on
the rigid labor market, w ≥ Aδ2ε , we have, according to (6), K ≤ A · 2
εδ
1−δ , which
gives
K · 2−
ε
1−δ ≤ A · 2−ε
where the equality holds for the equilibrium wage.
This allows to compare the two conditions (57) and (58). First, the left-hand
side of (57) is always greater than the one of (58). The right-hand side of 57
for the equilibrium wage is smaller than those of (58). If wage is not too much
higher than the equilibrium one, the relation between the two right-hand sides
continues to hold.
So, we can conclude that if (58) holds, then (57) holds as well. This means
that if the symmetric equilibrium exists under rigid labor market, it also exists
for the competitive labor market. However, it’s possible to have (58) violated
and (57) continue to hold. Consequently, we can conclude that agglomeration
appears more often under rigid labor market.
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